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What is ‘abortion culture’? Whenever family planning in former Soviet states is 
discussed it is almost inevitable that the phrase ‘abortion culture’ will be used 
to describe the context within which fertility was, and to an extent still is, 
controlled in this region. Abortion rates in the former Soviet states remain the 
highest in the developed world (Henshaw, Singh and Haas 1999). High 
abortion rates are said to be a result of abortion culture and, in a kind of 
circular argument, abortion culture the result of high abortion rates. Mention is 
often made of limited access to modern and effective contraception, but 
otherwise little attempt is made to unpick the elements that might together 
constitute abortion culture. 
 
Abortion rates in this region have neither been stable over time, nor the same 
within or between states; whilst a high abortion rate is seen as a characteristic 
feature of the former Soviet states, there is considerable diversity (Potts 1967; 
Agadjanian 2002).This suggests that the impact of abortion culture was not 
homogeneous but varied over the decades and was felt differentially by place 
and ethnicity. This in turn suggests that the constituents of abortion culture, or 
at least the degree to which they affected behaviour, may have varied too. 
 
The aim of this paper is to look at the background to abortion in the former 
Soviet bloc in general and in Estonia in particular, to see how an abortion 
culture might have been created and maintained, and to suggest a framework 
for the analysis of abortion culture. Such a framework might help to explain 
differences in fertility control practices over time and across states, and may 
also highlight those factors which have influenced the rate of decline in 
abortion rates since the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
 
Estonia is a good testing ground as here abortion rates vary with time and 
rates differ by ethnicity. Estonia also provides an interesting case as, 
historically, Estonia was ‘western’ in terms of fertility transition, had achieved 
below replacement fertility by the 1920s (Katus 1994) and had done so 
without the benefit of modern methods of contraception, which of course had 
not been developed at the time (Anderson, Katus, Puur and Silver 1993). In 
addition, evidence from other former Soviet states is used for illustration of the 
issues discussed. 
 
In this paper it is argued that abortion is not just an individual matter but is 
also a social phenomenon and as such, involves many actors. In the creation 
and maintenance of abortion culture, the roles of the state, service providers, 
society, and the individual are considered. Abortion in the context of the post-
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Soviet period is discussed and some thoughts about the future of abortion in 
this region are put forward. 
 
History and the ‘Woman Question’ 
 
Soviet state socialism was born of mass unrest in Russia in the late 19
th and 
early 20
th centuries. Female revolutionaries such as Alexandra Kollontai 
played an important part in the mobilisation of women to the cause (Kollontai 
1977a). Kollontai envisioned a future socialist society where women would be 
equal to men, ‘free’ to work (freed from domestic slavery) but able to have 
many children (Kollontai 1977c) In the new world the state would ensure that 
all children were fed, clothed, educated, housed and cared for (Kollontai 
1977c; Bebel 1988)  
 
There was however a divided women’s movement. The bourgeois feminists 
wanted to be free to work (in the professions, which was difficult for the 
educated woman at that time), but the proletarian woman might have 
preferred to be freed from work. The Russian working class woman did not 
need revolution to be freed to work, she already worked and worked hard, 
whether in the rural (peasant) situation or in the burgeoning urban centres. 
Kollontai, a socialist feminist, recognised the oppression of the proletarian 
woman on the basis of sex and class and argued that “the future of the family 
question is no less important than the achievement of political and economic 
independence” (Kollontai 1977b). However the Bolshevik leadership gave 
more credence to the Marxist view that class was the basis of oppression in 
capitalist society and once class issues were made obsolete in the new 
socialist society, the ‘woman question’ would be answered. 
 
Hence the post-revolutionary reality was quite different from that envisaged by 
Kollontai and Bebel. The’ woman question’ was not a major preoccupation for 
the leadership. They paid lip service to ‘equality’ without developing policies 
that might have helped to make it a reality (Holt 1977). Key revolutionary 
women found themselves demoted and the women’s departments, set up to 
support women’s issues, were closed by 1930 (Holt 1977).  
 
Not only was there little will on the part of the leadership to change women’s 
lives, there was also little opportunity to do so. From the start life was hard in 
Soviet Russia – before they could recover from the aftermath of revolutionary 
uprising and civil war, the people were subjected to forced collectivisation and 
industrialisation, and famine (Koutaissoff 1971). Women were not just free to 
work, they were expected to work alongside their male comrades in all 
spheres of labour
1. Indeed, women’s labour was vital. It is estimated that the 
losses to the Russian population during the period 1914 – 1920 totalled 25 
million, which would have resulted in a much depleted work force (Pirozhkov 
and Safarova 1994). However, women had a dual role - they were also 
expected to produce children even though the promised childcare facilities 
were slow to materialise. Modern methods of birth control were not available 
                                            
1 “the equal duty of all to labour, without distinction of sex, will become the first fundamental 
law of the Socialistic community” (Bebel 1988 p180) 
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and the practice of traditional methods was not widespread. Finding 
themselves pregnant, unable to feed themselves and their families, many 
women turned to abortion to terminate pregnancies they could not face. The 
only other alternative would have been to add to the already considerable 
number of abandoned children roaming the streets of post-revolutionary 
Russia (Koutaissoff 1971).  
 
Concerns over the level of illegal abortion and concomitant maternal morbidity 
and mortality, as well as recognition that repression of abortion had been a 
failure, led Soviet leaders to legalise abortion in 1920 (Avdeev, Blum and 
Troitskaya 1995). This was seen not as a woman’s right but as a temporary 
measure which would no longer be required when the socialist state was well 
established (Holt 1977; Avdeev, Blum and Troitskaya 1995). The need for 
abortion was, after all, the result of capitalism (Lenin 1973). Moreover, no 
mention was made of a role for family planning, during hard times or in the 
future and even Kollontai began to emphasise that motherhood would be a 
“social obligation” (Holt 1977p 119). This hegemonic ideology promoted the 
role of woman as mother-heroine, placed the needs of the nation above those 
of the individual and eliminated discussion of family planning (Avdeev 1994; 
Avdeev, Blum and Troitskaya 1995). 
 
The result was that abortion became established as a key element of fertility 
control (Popov 1991; Horga and Ludicke 1999). This deviates from the 
Western route to lower fertility, where birth rates were reduced first by 
traditional methods such as the calendar method and/or coitus interruptus on 
the part of individual couples and by societal level controls such as delayed 
and/or non-universal marriage. With the advent and accessibility of modern 
methods in the West, traditional methods were increasingly replaced by 
modern methods, though by the 1960’s it was recognised in many Western 
states that safe, legal abortion should be available too. 
 
The first era of legal abortion in Russia was short-lived - alarmed by the falling 
birth-rate, and concerned at the level of population losses sustained, not just 
from 1914 -1920, but throughout the 1920s and beyond, Stalin made abortion 
illegal once more in 1936. He made clear his belief that it was the duty of the 
Soviet woman to procreate (Attwood 1987; Remennick 1991). Ironically, the 
law was allegedly passed out of concern for the health and welfare of mother 
and child, while virtually the same wording was used in 1920 to legalise 
abortion (Avdeev, Blum and Troitskaya 1995). Only after Stalin’s death in 
1955 was the law again changed, permitting abortion on social, not just 
medical grounds.  
 
What did all this have to do with a country like Estonia? Estonia had been part 
of the Russian Empire since the early 1700s, but took the opportunity to gain 
independence while the Russians were otherwise engaged during the turmoil 
of WWI, revolution and civil war. Russia finally recognised the sovereignty of 
Estonia on the 2
nd of February 1920. However, the First Republic was short-
lived. Estonia was occupied during the Second World War, first by the 
Russians (1939-1940), next by the Germans (1941-1944) and finally by the 
Russians again. Estonia, like its Baltic neighbours Latvia and Lithuania, was 
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annexed and soon after became the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. Up to 
a point Estonia ‘inherited’ a new history and the legacy of the early Soviet 
days as there followed nearly half a century of occupation and ‘Sovietization’, 
the process by which the ’Soviet model’ was imposed in member republics. In 
addition, vast numbers of workers, soldiers and administrators from other 
Soviet republics (chiefly Russia) were directed to work and live in Estonia, so 
that over time those of titular nationality represented only about two-thirds of 
the population in the republic, only half the population in the capital city 
Tallinn, and were a minority in the north eastern region. 
 
In the early days, as elsewhere in the USSR, abortion was illegal (and had 
been illegal in the period of independence) (Anderson, Katus, Puur and Silver 
1993), except on medical grounds (Tietze and Henshaw 1986), but from the 
mid-fifties, women in Estonia had access to abortion. Like other ‘Soviet’ 
women they were expected to be full-time members of the labour force as well 
as mothers. The population had been depleted by the out-migration of Baltic 
Germans to the fatherland in 1939, war deaths, executions and deportations. 
All ages and both sexes were represented (even in deportations to Siberia), 
but men disproportionately so (Winter 1992). Hence the labour of women was 
crucial in the post-war period. However, childcare facilities were inadequate, 
the housing situation was dire (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993) and even food 
supplies were erratic. Most women opted for small families
2, and in the 
absence of (effective) contraception they had little alternative but to terminate 
unwanted pregnancies. 
 
The State  
The Soviet state has been described as ‘totalitarian’ which is defined as ‘a 
system of government that is centralized and dictatorial and requires complete 
subservience to the state’ (Pearsall 2001). However, in spite of this apparent 
omnipotence women continued to procure abortions, even during the period 
when this was illegal. 
 
Of course we know that criminalising abortion does not eliminate the practice; 
abortions are still performed, but often under unsafe conditions. However, law 
and policy are important – not just in making something legal, but ‘legitimating’ 
it in a wider sense. What role then did the state play in creating and sustaining 
abortion culture? 
 
Firstly, the state was responsible for abortion law, legalising abortion in 1920, 
revoking this in 1936 and once again liberalising abortion in 1955. It could 
never be said that the state approved of abortion, however the 1955 
legislation may well have been signalling what the state would accept without 
approval. Certainly, in the early 1950s, just before liberalisation, data suggest 
that legal sanctions were not being implemented (Avdeev, Blum and 
Troitskaya 1995). The state was also responsible for law concerning 
sterilization. Sterilization was only permitted for strictly defined medical 
reasons, for example following a third delivery by Caesarean section. Couples 
                                            
2 The fertility rates of non native (mainly Russian) women in Estonia were even lower than 
native Estonians by the 1960s Taagepera, R. (1981). "Baltic Population Changes 1950 - 
1980." Journal of Baltic Studies XII(1). 
  4 
 
were therefore denied the possibility of sex free of the risk of pregnancy when 
they might have been prepared to adopt a permanent method. 
 
Secondly, the state was, at least theoretically, responsible for the provision of 
services. Abortions were carried out in hospitals and polyclinics, but the 
establishment of family planning clinics was neglected. Family planning 
belonged within the private realm, unlike abortion and pregnancy which were 
matters of medical, and therefore state interest (Vikat 1994). Only in the 
1980s was the need for family planning recognised and then the attitude was 
dictatorial: "From the early 1980s the Ministry of Health enforced family 
planning measures to reduce abortions" (Avdeev 1994). A further disincentive 
to the use of preventive methods was that the state charged for 
contraceptives whilst abortion was free (Karro 1997a).  
 
Thirdly, in a planned economy the state was responsible for the production 
and distribution of goods (Bebel 1988). The Soviet record in this sphere was 
poor (UNDP 2002). The production of birth control supplies was not a priority 
(Heitlinger 1979), and their distribution was sporadic.
3 It was, after all, a 
command not demand, economy - the state prioritised production with scant 
attention to the wishes or even needs of the consumer.  
 
Lastly, the state should have provided up-to-date and accurate education and 
information, or at least facilitate its provision. However, sex education was 
virtually absent from the curriculum until the late 1980s (Attwood 1987). Kon 
argues that the state, in an Orwellian way, feared sex as it was something 
outside of party control. Hence, sex education was taboo and the population 
was both “sexually ignorant and mute” (Kon 1992).  
 
Not only did the public have little access to accurate information, the medical 
profession fared little better (Bruyniks 1994). The oral contraceptive was 
effectively banned in 1974. The hegemonic view was that the pill was 
dangerous
4 and the ban ensured that no independent thinkers could prescribe 
it. Furthermore, the state ensured that no alternative views were promulgated
5 
– the media were organs of the state, there were no non-governmental 
organisations (which might have campaigned for contraception) and the 
churches, whose members might have protested at abortion levels, were 
suppressed. Willekens and Scherbov state that “Contraception was not an 
issue to be discussed before perestroika”, suggesting that not only was 
provision of information poor, it was also suppressed (1994 p208).  
 
Paradoxically, the lack of investment in contraceptive methods and family 
planning clinics led to an excessive consumption of scarce resources by 
                                            
3 This was not only the case for contraceptives – other essentials, such as toilet paper and 
soap were often unobtainable Van der Post, L. (1965). Journey into Russia. London, Reprint 
Society.. Sanitary towels were more often than not absent from the shelves and tampons 
were not produced at all. 
4 “The long-term use of pills can have as a result a serious destruction of the main internal 
organs…” 1983 official edict cited by Popov, Visser and Ketting 1993 p 232 
5 This was not what Bebel envisaged when he stated that the socialist press would contain 
“the conflict of opinions of those who seek the best” (Bebel 1988 p222) 
  5 
 
abortion services (Remennick 1991). Indeed, the system meant that the 
actual costs of any particular aspect of healthcare were not calculated (EOHS 
2000). This raises the question of whether the state had a policy concerning 
family planning, or whether what has been observed was the consequence of 
the absence of a coherent policy. On the other hand, the result was that the 
state effectively retained control over women’s fertility. As late as 1959 
Khrushchev was still associating birth control with bourgeois ideology and 
asserting the need for births, not just for the labour force but also “for the 
future of our nation” (quoted in Avdeev, Blum and Troitskaya 1995). The 
development and distribution of modern methods of birth control risked 
leaving “choice in the hands of the individual, and that might have unforeseen 
demographic and moral consequences” (Heitlinger 1979). 
 
Service Providers 
Like other professionals, doctors and healthcare workers were ‘blanketed’ by 
the totalitarian state and isolated from their peers in the West. The state had 
control over information and communication as well as the education of 
medical professionals and their careers (Stloukal 1999) and was willing and 
able to deal harshly with dissent. People “were paralysed as citizens because 
they were convinced that everything was controlled. One of my colleagues 
has called this "the relentless application of a quiet coercion leading to 
compliance"... children were taught that any adolescent rebellion could deny 
them a university place. Cooperation, on the other hand, was the route to a 
better life. So you had the twin methods of bribery and blackmail” (McDermid 
2002). Not surprisingly, healthcare providers accepted and promoted the 
‘party line’.  
 
Doctors and their colleagues in healthcare were deprived of access to their 
own service statistics – these were sent ‘vertically’ to Moscow, there was no 
horizontal dissemination. From 1929 until 1988 abortion statistics were 
classified ‘secret’ and only available to the USSR Ministry of Health in 
Moscow (Popov 1991). Hence, service providers were unable to compare, for 
example, their abortion rates with colleagues in other locations. Needless to 
say, they were not able to make international comparisons, especially with the 
West. This was treason. Nor were providers able to decide upon and 
implement changes as healthcare decisions were made in Moscow (EOHS 
2000). Indeed, taking responsibility or showing initiative were considered risky 
(Stloukal 1999). 
 
The focus of medical advance was on methods of abortion, not the 
development of preventive measures. Not only were doctors unable to make 
statistical comparisons with colleagues abroad, but they were also isolated 
from debates surrounding ‘best practice’ which might have challenged their 
assumptions regarding contraception (Brandrup-Lukanow 1999; Stloukal 
1999). 
 
Modern contraceptives were distrusted. The contraceptive pill was considered 
dangerous and indeed it may have been – the Soviet variety was an early 
version containing high hormone doses and would therefore be more likely to 
produce adverse side effects (Westoff, Sharmanov, Sullivan and Croft 1998). 
  6 
 
There was a ban on the (legal) import of the Western product as the Soviets 
wished to be self-sufficient in all things. The state had a monopoly on import 
and distribution of eastern bloc products (Popov, Visser and Ketting 1993). In 
common with many other consumer products, the supply of the pill was 
erratic. Intra-uterine devices were old-fashioned - for example no copper IUDs 
were available (Popov, Visser and Ketting 1993). Condoms were of poor 
quality with a high failure rate (Defosses 1981). The production of better 
quality contraceptives was not considered an industrial priority (Heitlinger 
1979). 
 
Abortion was promoted as a safer alternative, although this was not always so 
– the incidence of adverse sequelae was a matter of concern in the Soviet 
Union (Remennick 1991). In addition, little is known about the consequences 
of repeat or serial abortion (Bruyniks 1994; Brandrup-Lukanow 1999). On the 
other hand, for many years abortion was illegal in the West (and being 
performed in less-than-ideal conditions) when it was being performed legally 
in hospitals in the Eastern bloc. In addition the use of the vacuum aspiration 
technique, though pioneered by Simpson in Scotland in 1860 and used by 
Bykov in Russia as early as 1927, was already in common usage in Russia by 
1967 (Potts 1967), though it was not adopted in the UK and USA until 1977 
(Tietze and Henshaw 1986). This method is still regarded as the safest for 
terminations in the first trimester. 
 
An ‘abortion industry’ was created (Grant 2004c) with many doctors working 
full-time in performing abortions (Stloukal 1999) – what incentive would there 
have been for a doctor to discourage abortion when that was how he or she 
earned a living? 
 
Society/Community 
Those living under Soviet rule became immured, accepted the inevitable and 
lost the will to resist. A sense of powerlessness was pervasive. Those born 
later had never experienced any other life and lacked comparative information 
- "How to explain to people who have never been out in the fresh air or had a 
window open, that the room they live in is stuffy almost to the point of 
suffocation?" (Van der Post 1965p42)  
 
The system bred a culture of dependency on the state – it was expected that 
the state would provide (or not) and in healthcare this meant cure rather than 
prevention. In addition, public opinion was “physician-dictated” (Popov, Visser 
and Ketting 1993) and physicians themselves had been ’informed’ of the 
dangers of the oral contraceptive. 
 
There was probably some stigma attached to abortion, at least there is 
evidence of reluctance on the part of some women to report abortions 
(Anderson, Katus, Puur and Silver 1994). Some abortions were also carried 
out ‘privately’ in order to avoid the statutory sickness absence note, which 
revealed details of the operation and 3 day hospital stay (Remennick 1991).  
On the other hand, it must have been difficult to stigmatise something that 
was so common – stigma is usually reserved for ‘outsiders’ and applied by 
‘insiders’. In the Soviet situation, who could cast the first stone?  
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Generally the population can expect the media to extract information from the 
state and disseminate it to the public. However, under the Soviet system the 
media were part of the state machinery, therefore they were not subjecting the 
state or providers to scrutiny (Stloukal 1999), not calling them to account, nor 
raising issues such as the abortion rate (other than to blame this for low birth 
rate). ‘Civil society’ was empty – there were no pressure groups, no non-
governmental organisations or at least no non-party organisations. The 
church had little power or influence as the Soviet state had “abolished God” 
(Van der Post 1965p40). 
 
Was there an acceptance of abortion? Up to a point, yes, though abortion was 
seen not as desirable but inevitable. In addition the abortion issue had “been  
deliberately denied its ethical and humanitarian dimensions”. The embryo was 
seen as biological material and the abortion as removal of that material as 
opposed to the termination of a potential human life (Remennick 1991 p841). 
 
The individual 
We, in the west, often refer to abortion as a ‘choice’, but what choice was 
there during the Soviet era?  
 
Sex education in schools was at worst non-existent or at best inadequate. 
(Remennick 1991; Bruyniks 1994). Other possible sources of information, 
such as the media, were state-controlled and the airing of sexual issues was 
taboo. Few parents felt comfortable discussing sex with their children, so 
young people discovered by trial and error. Family planning advice was first 
received from the gynaecologist after the first birth or abortion (Grant 2004c).  
 
The state controlled supplies of contraceptives (such as they were) and both 
legitimate and black market supplies were often interrupted, which would have 
been a problem for those using the pill or the condom (Vikat 1994). It was 
generally cheaper for the individual to resort to abortion than to use 
contraception. Many women were advised against the use of oral 
contraceptives
6 (Remennick 1991; Karro 1997a) and the intra-uterine device 
was only prescribed for women who had previously had a full term pregnancy. 
There were no competing sources of information, such as family planning 
associations or pro-life or pro-choice pressure groups.  
 
Child bearing was early in the reproductive span and pregnancy often 
preceded marriage. Marriage and childbearing moved a couple up the 
housing list and this was a key issue due to the shortage of suitable housing. 
Early childbearing and an average family size of 2 meant that many 
women/couples were controlling fertility for over 25 years. Vasectomy and 
sterilisation were not permitted. So many years ‘at risk’ clearly meant a high 
probability that abortion would be necessary (Marston and Cleland 2003). 
This led to a different abortion ‘profile’ to that of the West, where abortion 
                                            
6 Those doctors who prescribed the pill also advised regular pill ‘holidays’ and this practice is 
still common. Unfortunately this leads to a number of unintended pregnancies during this 
‘holiday’ time. (Helle Karro 2003 personal communication) 
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tends to be more common amongst the young (Anderson, Katus, Puur and 
Silver 1993; Anderson 1998; Bankole, Singh and Haas 1999). 
 
In view of the absence of choice, there must have been an element of 
internalisation (D'Andrade 1995)
7, so that women found a way of accepting 
the inevitable. Remennick states that there was a “psychological tolerance to 
abortion on both individual and social levels” and that the procedure was 
viewed as a “routine, although certainly unpleasant, medical procedure, 
comparable , say, to a removal of a decayed tooth” (Remennick 1991). 
However, as the procedure was usually carried out without the benefit of 
anaesthetic and on an assembly-line basis, women must have dreaded 
abortion. 
 
Why did couples terminate pregnancies rather than having children? People’s 
lives were difficult during the Soviet era and not conducive to having large 
families. Relationships between men and women remained traditional with the 
notable exception that women were expected to participate in the labour 
force. Soviet-style equality was “masculine-oriented” so that women could be 
engineers or astronauts, but still had to go home to do the housework 
(Heitlinger 1979; Karro 1997a). Housing, particularly in urban areas, was in 
short supply and apartments were very small (Koutaissoff 1971).  Estonia was 
the most highly urbanised of the Soviet republics (Parming 1972), but even 
rural lives were ‘urbanised’ as people on collective farms lived in blocks of 
flats. However it is interesting to note the higher fertility of Estonians in 
Estonia than Russians living in Estonia. There may have been a hint of 
demographic competition – certainly the titular nationalities in both Latvia and 
Estonia feared becoming ethnic minorities in their own lands. 
 
Abortion culture in Estonia 
Estonia had a history of being more advanced than Russia in development 
terms. For example, whereas literacy approached 100% as early as the 19
th 
century in Estonia (Coale, Anderson and Harm 1979), only 25% of Russians 
were literate by the time of the revolution (Van der Post 1965). Estonia was 
also ‘ahead’ of Russia in terms of demographic transition. Indeed Estonia fell 
west of the Hajnal line (Katus 1994). Replacement fertility levels were 
achieved early and without the benefit of modern contraception. During the 
1920’s and 1930’s, in common with many western European states, fertility 
fell to below replacement level (Titmuss and Titmuss 1942).  
 
In a society where fertility had been controlled with little recourse to abortion, 
it is less easy to understand why abortion later became so much more 
prevalent, especially amongst cohorts born in the early 1950s (Katus 2000). 
This may however be partly explained by the following. Firstly, part of fertility 
decline earlier in the 20
th century could be attributed to late and far from 
universal marriage. As more women were exposed (via formal marriage or, 
later, less formal partnerships) and as the age at first birth fell (Katus 2000) 
                                            
7 "Through secondary appraisals and the cultural shaping of emotion, the beliefs and values 
of a culture may be internalized. The term internalization is common in psychological 
anthropology, where it refers to the process by which cultural representations become a part 
of the individual; that is, become what is right and true." (D’Andrade 1995 p227) 
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and the length of time exposed to the risk of pregnancy was extended, the 
number of unwanted pregnancies would tend to rise (Tietze and Bongaarts 
1975). Secondly, considerable numbers of migrants, chiefly from Russia, were 
directed to work and live in Estonia (and elsewhere in the USSR). Migrants 
brought with them their own reproductive culture, including higher abortion 
rates (Katus 2000) 
8. In addition, Russian doctors and specialists were 
moved, along with the working population, and they too brought with them 
their own beliefs and working practices. Thirdly, the local population may have 
adopted some of the habits of the incomers, especially if these were seen to 
be beneficial. Some who might otherwise have been content with, for 
example, calendar methods and coitus interruptus, and accepted the risk of 
method failure, might have seen the advantage of abortion. Lastly, abortion 
was legalised in the Soviet Union in 1955. This may have led to a ‘real’ rise in 
abortion (more abortions were performed) or equally it could have led to an 
increase in the number of abortions performed legally and recorded (Avdeev, 
Blum and Troitskaya 1995). 
 
Abortion culture may have become established in Estonia. Possible evidence 
of this is that abortion rates were, and still are, considerably higher than in the 
West, but on the other hand they were not as high as, for example, Russia. In 
addition, as low fertility rates were achieved early and without the use of 
modern contraception, natural/traditional methods must have been used and it 
is difficult to accept that these could have, or would have, been forgotten. 
Indeed Anderson et al state that, for Estonian women, abortion was not, after 
all, the primary method of fertility control, but a resort when other methods 
failed, whereas for Russian women in Estonia abortion was more likely to be 
the primary method of fertility control (Anderson, Katus, Puur and Silver 
1993). This is important as what is now being observed (increased uptake of 
contraception and falling abortion rates) may be a change from one type of 
contraception (traditional and not highly effective) to another (modern and 
effective), as much as a change from abortion to contraception, at least for 
some groups. 
 
The Post Soviet Era 
 
The New State 
Soviet successor states, despite their diversity, are all experiencing a decline 
in abortion and this in spite of marked fertility decline (EOHS 2000; CoE 
2002). To what can this be attributed?  
 
Clearly, the role of the state has undergone rapid and far-reaching change. 
Generally, the move has been towards democratic free-market nationhood, so 
that the role of the state has been diminished. Successor states have had to 
devise their own abortion legislation, but this has tended to remain liberal, 
although in Russia for example recent legislation reduced the number of 
‘valid’ reasons for an abortion after the first trimester from thirteen to four 
(Paton-Walsh 2003). Estonian legislation allows abortion on demand in the 
                                            
8 It is interesting to note that Soviet women who emigrated to Israel took their own abortion 
practices there too Sabatello, E. F. (1992). "Estimates of Demand for Abortion among Soviet 
Immigrants in Israel." Studies in Family Planning 23(4): 268-273..  
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first trimester and up to 21 weeks on medical grounds or if the mother is under 
fifteen years of age or over 45. However, abortion decline cannot be attributed 
to restrictive legislation, in Estonia or elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc. 
 
Recent legislation in Estonia allows sterilization (male or female) for the 
purposes of fertility control, but only for those over 35 years of age, or those 
who already have three children. This could allow those who have completed 
their families to have many years free of the need for contraception and free 
too of the fear of unwanted pregnancy. There may however be little uptake. 
Qualitative research reveals an abhorrence for the idea of permanent 
methods and some suggestion that sterilization is associated with Nazism 
(Grant 2004c). So, an increase in the use of permanent methods cannot 
account for a decline in abortion. 
 
Although there have arisen a plethora of private health providers, the vast 
majority of people still rely on state (or municipal) services. These are no 
longer free (except for emergencies), but operate under the cost-sharing 
principle. Perhaps due to what Agadjanian describes as the “inertia of the 
soviet tradition” (2002), the organisation of healthcare has proved to be 
remarkably resistant to change. The system remains top-heavy, with a 
sizeable number of specialists and hospital doctors and a relatively 
undeveloped primary sector, in spite of attempts to create a family doctor 
service. Doctors are now being trained (or re-trained) to fulfil the role of family 
doctor, where it is intended that they will be the first port of call for family 
planning advice (EOHS 2000). However, as patients still have direct access to 
some specialists including gynaecologists (and venereologists) this attempt to 
change the patient’s pathway to reproductive health services may not 
succeed (EOHS 2000). Family planning advice still tends to be delivered by 
gynaecologists and for too many young women this is rather late.  
 
In recognition of the new challenges faced by the population, especially 
HIV/AIDS, the Estonian government adopted a new national reproductive 
health programme, but its implementation has been hampered as it was not 
allocated a share of the state budget (UNFPA 2003). 
 
The state is no longer responsible for the production and distribution of 
supplies; there is now a market in contraceptives. However, the state health 
budget struggles to cope with the financial burden of internationally priced 
pharmaceuticals, as do individuals when they pay a part of the cost (for 
example for the oral contraceptive) or buy their own (for example condoms). 
In spite of this there is good evidence that the use of modern methods of 
contraception has increased. In Estonia the increase in supply facilitated by 
the state has improved access to contraception. 
 
In terms of information and education, great strides have been made. Doctors 
and scientists were given some freedom to travel to international conferences 
during the 1980s. However, it was not until the 1990s that high abortion rates 
were discussed (Papp, Kontula and Kosunen 1997). Doctors now have full 
access to data and peer-reviewed international journals.  
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In Latvia conservative attitudes have hampered attempts to introduce sex 
education into the curriculum (Cengel 1999). In Estonia however ‘human 
education’, which includes sex education, has been revolutionised. Teaching 
is earlier, broader and deeper. However, some teachers have found the 
material, and the rôle, too challenging, so that the standard of sex education 
in schools remains variable (Grant 2004c).  
 
The Media 
Those raised during the Soviet period were deprived of sex education within 
the school system and had little reliable information from other sources. 
Adults have been ‘catching up’ in terms of sex education, via the media. 
Some of this is factual and of high quality. However, the market for 
pornography was quicker to establish itself than public television and radio 
were to adapt to the new freedom, so that in Estonia as elsewhere, a good 
deal of misinformation was made available before high quality information 
could reach the public (Peetso, Laanpere, Part and Pollumaa 1999). In 
reference to the Ukraine, Vornik and Govorun state that oppression has been 
replaced by exploitation and that society has become permissive, but without 
proper sex education (1996). In addition, not all the media employ responsible 
journalism – the ‘yellow press’, with a taste for reporting ‘moral panics’
9, has 
become established in Estonia in recent years (Ilvi Joe-Cannon – personal 
communication). 
 
A New Society 
Pressure groups and non-governmental organisations are now being created, 
for example Eesti Pereplaneerismise Liit , The Estonian Family Planning 
Association linked to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF 
2003), and their impact is growing (Karro, Klimas and Lazdane 1997c). In 
addition, the influence of the churches has grown, though the impact of this 
may be negative in terms of reproductive health (Karro, Klimas and Lazdane 
1997c). 
 
Improvements in the expertise of providers, the education of young people 
(and some of their parents), and the development of non-governmental 
organisations have all served to increase the demand for contraception, 
without which access to modern methods would be wasted. However, 
economic transition has imposed some constraints. At the same time as the 
state has instituted fees for healthcare, many people are experiencing 
unemployment or a lack of job security which makes fees expensive for many 
people. In addition, fertility rates have fallen substantially over the decade 
since independence, so that even with increased contraceptive prevalence 
abortion may still play a key rôle. There is a level of anxiety about the new 
system, including impending membership of the European Union, and a 
continuing fear in Estonia of Russian aggression: “It is like living next to a 
volcano” (Eve Variksoo, personal communication 2003). The increase in age 
at birth may be a sign of people adopting what Stloukal calls “wait-and-see 
forms of behavior (sic)” as a response to feelings of insecurity (1999 p37). 
                                            
9 after Stanley Cohen 1972 , ‘Folk devils and moral panics – the creation of the Mods and 
Rockers, London, MacGibbon and Kee 
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A Threat to Choice 
A worrying development is the emergence of an anti-abortion movement in 
states of the former Soviet bloc (Stloukal 1999; Walder 2000). This has three 
elements: firstly the revival of religion (especially relevant is the recovery of 
the Catholic
10 and Russian Orthodox churches); secondly there is a 
reawakening of conservatism as a reaction to years of socialism and all its ills 
(and in this context the ills are women’s ‘liberation’ in general and abortion on 
request in particular); and thirdly, with reference to perilously low fertility rates, 
there is a fear of “ethnic extinction” (Haas 1996p72), especially in the Baltic 
states where titular population sizes are so small (WHO/UNFPA 1995). Some 
go as far as blaming the ‘demographic crisis’ on non-governmental 
organizations promoting contraception and the right to abortion (Johansson 
2001). However, it is likely that recent steep fertility declines throughout the 
region are the result of economic change and associated social upheaval, 
indeed there is a near linear relationship between the economic situation and 
fertility in Estonia (and Lithuania) (UNECE 1999). After all, abortion is only a 
proximate determinant (Horga and Ludicke 1999). This situation demonstrates 
perfectly what Freedman and Isaacs call “the tension between demographic 
priorities and reproductive choice” (1993p18). It is to be hoped that 
governments are not persuaded to pass restrictive abortion legislation, which 
may serve only to transfer abortions from legal to illegal status. Restrictions 
have been considered in several former Soviet states (Rahman, Katzive and 
Henshaw 1998). So far abortion and the birth rate have not been explicitly 
linked by policy makers in Estonia, even though a population affairs Minister 
has been appointed to explore ways to increase fertility (Gunter 2003). In 
Latvia, the Minister for Child and Family Affairs Ainars Bastiks, who has also 
been charged with increasing fertility levels, has been quoted as stating “It is 
tragic that so many babies that could have been born were killed” 
(BalticTimes 2003 p2). 
 
Conclusion 
Abortion culture was just one of the consequences of an ideological stance 
which prioritised the productive over the private sphere, industry over the 
health and service sectors. Abortion culture was created by a "complex 
combination of perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and practices" and it might be 
"extremely resistant to change" (Horga and Ludicke 1999p109). However in 
populations where abortion culture was never entrenched we may observe 
that abortion rates fall faster, because women or couples had a previously 
unmet aspiration for contraception, than in those groups where abortion 
culture was well established. In addition, abortion culture may fade as those 
raised in its atmosphere become older and move out of the reproductive ages, 
to be replaced by those with better knowledge and different attitudes and 
practices, as Agadjanian found in Kazakhstan (2002). 
 
Clearly, access to a range of modern affordable contraceptive methods will 
hasten further decline. However, in the new market economies healthcare is 
                                            
10 Not only does the Catholic Church in Lithuania oppose abortion, but also contraception and 
sterilization. (Karro, Klimas and Lazdane 1997) 
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no longer free-at-point-of-delivery. Cost recovery policies mean that most 
people have to pay for contraception and the level of payment is perceived as 
expensive for some (Brandrup-Lukanow 1999). In Estonia a social insurance 
system has been established, however there are some people who are not 
insured and who are not therefore entitled to subsidies (Karro 1997a; EOHS 
2000). Indeed economic considerations are especially important in the post-
Soviet context where unemployment and underemployment are new concerns 
(Puur 1997a; Puur 1997b). 
 
Sex education that is light years away from that provided during the Soviet 
period should begin to leave its mark, especially if and when parents 
themselves are well informed and no longer reluctant to talk to their own 
children about sexual issues (Grant 2004c). 
 
In order to analyze abortion culture, it is important to examine the history of 
the society in question, the role played by the state, by service providers, by 
society as well as the individual. It is easy to blame former Soviet bloc 
peoples for high abortion rates and yet most of those involved would have 
been powerless to act differently. As Kai Haldre states "I'm sure that if people 
in the Netherlands had lived in isolation under Soviet occupation for 50 years, 
they would have similar abortion rates. For a better understanding of why 
people in this region have behaved in certain ways under the given 
circumstances I'd like to recommend reading George Orwell's classics 1984 
and Animal Farm" (2000). 
 
Independence has presented former Soviet states with difficult challenges but 
also considerable opportunities. Great strides have been made in 
undermining abortion culture and abortion rates have fallen. If the impetus is 
maintained in training providers and teachers, involving NGOs, supporting 
high quality public broadcasting and health promotion campaigns, much will 
be accomplished. It is however vital that policy makers ensure that a wide 
range of affordable services and  contraceptive methods are available so that 
use and effectiveness are maximised and only a “residual demand” for 
abortion remains (Cohen 1998; Marston and Cleland 2003). It would be ironic 
if newly acquired freedoms lead to loss of reproductive rights, so perhaps the 
most important task for those in power is to resist the pressure to pass 
restrictive abortion legislation, which could have dire and predictable 
consequences for women in Estonia and in other states which share the 
Soviet past.  
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